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Abstract
Beyond trade facilitation, transparency norms in the WTO legal context are, implicitly and explicitly,
aimed at addressing problems in the domestic administrative laws of its members. Through the
lens of global governance, this article attempts to shed more light on the power of transparency
norms enshrined in multilateral trading agreements under the aegis of the WTO. In this global
ruled-based system, transparency has become sufficiently powerful to be a multifunctional
instrument for promoting the rule of law, good governance, and democracy.
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Introduction
Despite continuing debates about whether Western liberal democratic values explicitly conflict with Eastern
culture in developing countries, Western transparency norms have recently become internationally and
domestically accepted and are considered to be a key component of good governance and public policy
in both public and private sectors. Christopher Hood and David Heald have labeled the recent emphasis
on transparency “quasi-religious in nature.”1 Transparency is the sine qua non for democracy, a panacea
for fighting corruption and bad governance. As with other “religious” manifestations, though, the nature
and reach of transparency is not always clear. This article seeks to probe the sources, adoption, and likely
impact of transparency norms.
Demands for greater transparency adhere inevitably to what many commentators agree is a fundamental
human right: Freedom of Information (hereinafter, FOI). In Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on December 10, 1948,2 the
international community collectively defined the basic rights of every individual worldwide as including:
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.3
Professor Ann Florini has stated that Article 19 defined the link between the right to know and the right to
speak.4 A free press is useless without the freedom to be informed.
From a broader perspective, many scholars have argued that the right to access documents held by
authorities needs to be globally recognized as a fundamental human right for several reasons, such as
guaranteeing full participation in political activities5 and assuring the functioning of democracy.6 More
specifically, Mark Bovens (2002) has emphasized that information rights should be considered as an
element of citizenship, a part of constitutionally-regulated civil rights establishing a crucial step toward
correcting existing problems of accountability.7
After World War II, under the aegis of globalism, transparency, along with the right to know, became a
hot topic in international law. This norm has increasingly spread from the West to the rest of the world
through international organizations (hereinafter, IOs). The New World Order, which has gradually shifted
from coexistence to cooperation, has facilitated this cooperative tendency. Transparency is demanded, in
order to compensate for the lack of a full-fledged international system of checks and balances.8 To date,
transparency norms have gradually been endorsed and adopted by such pillars of the international
economy as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade
Organization (WTO)—the focus of this article.
1TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE 135 (Christopher Hood & David Heald, eds., Proc. British Acad. Ser. 2006).
2G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), http://www.un.org/en/universal-declarati
on-human-rights/index.html.
3Id. art. 19.
4THE RIGHT TO KNOW: TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD (Ann Florini, ed. 2007).
5TOBY MENDEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY (2d ed. 2008).
6Article 19 Global Campaign for Free Expression, The Public’s Right to Know: Principles on Freedom of Information
Legislation (1999), https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/righttoknow.pdf.
7Mark Bovens, Information Rights, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 317, 341 (2002).
8Andrea Bianchi, On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International Law, in TRANSPARENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters, eds., 2013).
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Many scholars have highlighted the role of the WTO as a “policy-anchor.”9 In the WTO legal context,
transparency norms, from Article X of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)10 to Article
X of the 1994 GATT,11 have regularly been utilized by developed countries, whose strong economic power
and reputations within the international community have then enabled them to impose their standardized
policies on the WTO’s legal system.12 As a result, to be accepted as a new WTO member, developing and
transition state members must accept and internalize these unfamiliar policies in order to meet the
demands of global integration and economic promotion. In imposing such requirements, the WTO has
clearly become a mechanism by which international norms originating in Western industrialized countries
have been imposed; these are then adopted by weaker members with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
Together with other WTO principles, transparency norms were expected to significantly promote trade
liberalization and establish transnational economic interdependence. It is becoming increasingly clear, however,
that the impact of the WTO norms goes beyond the trade context. A growing number of empirical studies have
examined other potential or actual impacts of WTO regulations and obligations on developing countries. For
instance, the WTO could directly promote and disseminate values of good governance through its functioning
and decision-making to help consolidate its institutional and regulatory capacities in developing countries.13
Susan Ariel Aaronson and Abouharb have argued that while the WTO does not tend to explicitly affect the
governance of its member states, group of states in negotiating processes and new state members all have
moved toward a more transparent society by improving their policies on access to information.14 In other words,
WTO regulations and obligations have indirectly resulted in governmental change.
More specifically, some contemporary scholars have analyzed the impact of WTO accession on the
promotion of democracy and legitimacy. Professor Padideh Ala’i has mentioned the role of WTO
jurisprudence underpinning in Article X of GATT, which concerns transparency and due process in
consolidating good governance both internationally and domestically.15 Other scholars have stressed the
positive impacts of transparency norms and other WTO actions on anticorruption efforts and democracy-
9See Sudip Ranjan Basu, Does WTO accession affect domestic economic policies and institutions? (UN Conf. on Trade
& Dev., Geneva, HEI Working Paper No: 03/2008, Feb. 14, 2008), http://repec.graduateinstitute.ch/pdfs/Working_papers/
HEIDWP03-2008.pdf; Michael J. Ferrantino, Policy Anchors: Do Free Trade Agreements and WTO Accessions Serve as
Vehicles for Developing-Country Policy Reform? (Off. Econ., U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. 2006-04-A, Apr.
2006), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/EC200604A.pdf; Sam Laird, WTO Rules and Good Practice on Export Policy
(WTO Trade Pol’y Rev. Div., Staff Working Paper TPRD9701.WPF, March 1997), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/
ptpr9701.pdf; Robert Wolfe, Regulatory Transparency, Developing Countries, and the Fate of the WTO, 2 WORLD TRADE REV.
157 (2003).
10General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (GATT 1947), https://www.wto.
org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm.
11The 1994 GATT adopted the provisions of the 1947 GATT, “as rectified, amended or modified by the terms of legal
instruments which have entered into force before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement”, https://www.wto.
org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm. See also the Marrakesh Agreement, which resulted from the Uruguay Round
and established the WTO and acknowledged the continuation of, and updates to, the GATT. Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 Apr. 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/
Volume%201867/volume-1867-I-31874-English.pdf.
12Alasdair Roberts, A Partial Revolution: The Diplomatic Ethos and Transparency in Intergovernmental Organizations, in
TRANSPARENCY AND SECRECY: A READER LINKING LITERATURE AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 67 (Suzanne J. Piotrowski, ed. 2010).
13Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the World Trade Organization: Building a Foundation of Administrative Law, in
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (William J. Davey & John Jackson, eds., 2008).
14See Susan Ariel Aaronson & M. Rodwan Abouharb, Does the WTO help member states improve governance?
13 WORLD TRADE REV. 547 (2014).
15Padideh Ala’i, The WTO and the Anti-Corruption Movement, 6 LOYOLA UNIV. CHICAGO INT’L L. REV. 259, 278 (2008).
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building in developing and transition countries. Some examples of these actions are the accession
procedures,16 the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM),17 and various implicit WTO agreements.18
Obviously, analyzing the impact of norms on a given state must inevitably and initially be contextualized
to local legislation and political orientation.
Significantly, the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001 defined transparency as one of three vital
elements of trade liberalism.19 Beyond trade, as asserted in the Report of the Consultative Board to
Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi (Sutherland Report), transparency is key to addressing issues
relating not only to the governance and legitimacy of the WTO itself, but also to those of their members
due to the member-driven milieu.20
It is apparent that transparency policy in the WTO context has expanded beyond its focus on trade
facilitation. This article will conduct a comprehensive study of the diverse aims of transparency norms in
WTO jurisprudence to shed more light on the hypothesis that transparency in global trade institutions is
more than just a tool for promoting trade liberalization.
Article X of GATT: The Transparency Principle for Building the Rule of Law
Article X of the GATT of 1994 (Gatt 1994) may appear to be simply a reiteration of Article X of the GATT of
1947 (Gatt 1947) without any amendment.21 In fact, there is an underlying legal distinction between the
two articles, as affirmed in Article II:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement.22 The legal distinction results from the
history of each article: Article X of GATT 1947 was explicitly enacted to serve as the Havana Charter for the
establishment of the International Trade Organization (ITO). Unfortunately, the Havana Charter never came
into effect, and the ITO never actually existed. Eventually, however, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round,
resulting in the Marrakesh Agreement and the creation of the WTO, invoked the provisions of GATT 1947.
More specifically, it was transformed in GATT 1994 from a consensus-based legal norm into a fundamental
16See Basu, supra note 9; Monika Bauhr & Naghmeh Nasiritousi, Towards better Governments? A theoretical
framework for the Influence of International Organizations (2009 QoG Working Paper Series); Manfred Elsig, The
democratizing effects of multilateral organizations: a cautionary note on the WTO, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 487 (2013),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-trade-review/article/the-democratizing-effects-of-multilateral-organizations-
a-cautionary-note-on-the-wto/DDFAC9D7E32ED1588314ABBB996DA053.
17Susan Ariel Aaronson & M. Rodwan Abouharb, Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up? (Geo. Wash. Univ., Inst.
for Int’l Econ. Policy Inst. for Int’l Econ. Pol’y Working Paper Series IIEP-WP-2014-7 (June 2014))[hereinafter Aaronson &
Abouharb, Clean Up ].
18See Steve Charnovitz, The WTO and the rights of the individual, 36 INTERECONOMICS 98 (2001), https://link.springer.
com/article/10.1007/BF02973775; Mary Comerford Cooper, International Organizations and Democratization: Testing the
Effect of GATT/WTO Membership (Asia Pacific Res. Ctr., April 2003); Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, Corruption and the
WTO Legal System, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 737,770 (2009); Friedl Weiss & Silke Steiner, Transparency as an Element of Good
Governance in the Practice of the EU and the WTO: Overview and Comparison, 30 FORDHAM INT’L LJ. 1545, 1586 (2006).
19The other two vital elements are non-discrimination and procedural fairness. See World Trade Organization, Doha
Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1 (2001), https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.
20WTO Consultative Board Report, The Future of the WTO: Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium
(2004); https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf.
21Padideh Ala’i, From the Periphery to the Center? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on Transparency and Good
Governance, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 779, 802 (2008); Terry Collins-Williams & Robet Wolfe, Transparency as a trade policy tool:
the WTO’s cloudy windows, 9 WORLD TRADE REV. 551, 581 (2010).
22Article II:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement states, “The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in
Annex 1A . . . is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947.” Marrakesh
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 11.
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principle of rule-based trade policy,23 or, in other words, “from negative regulation—what governments
must not do, to positive regulations—what governments must do.”24 This transformation25 marked a
change in the legal nature of the transparency principle from a toothless formal provision26 into one of
the five basic principles of the WTO and the bedrock principle for multilateral trading systems.
The transformation did not significantly alter the content of Article X, whose essence had originally
been based on the 1946 US Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter APA). In retrospect, McCubbins,
Noll, and Weingast in their much-cited article,27 note that the basic function of the APA was to provide
political actors a useful means of monitoring bureaucratic compliance. Through the APA, politicians, in
cooperation with the judiciary, use the courts to expedite their control over bureaucratic functioning. For
GATT 1947, the US government, assuming it could manipulate the ITO (considered a legislative body) to
control the system of bureaucracy (contracting parties), proposed this model of domestic administrative
law in order to monitor the compliance of contracting parties with the Havana Charter’s provisions. In the
post-World War II world, the United States was recognized as a growing global empire threatening to
dominate and control most of the 23 founding Members of GATT 1947.28 Therefore, the unconditional
acceptance of the contracting parties to the US proposal for the publication and administration of trade
regulation can, in large, be attributed to pressure from US power.
International consensus on these efforts was not only because of the hegemonic position of the US
but also because of the perceived insignificance of the provision, as Ostry observes:
Article X in the GATT replicates most of the American approach. The word transparency does not
appear but the article spells out in detail the rule for “publication and administration” of trade
regulations with the latter emphasizing the desirability (rather than necessity) of independent
tribunal and judicial review . . . [B]e that as it may, the inclusion of Article X on transparency at the
time of GATT’s origin appeared to be non-controversial to the drafters of the new system, because
it mainly involved reporting tariff schedules. It was non-controversial because it was insignificant.29
23Padideh Ala’i & Matthew D’Orsi, Transparency in International Economic Relations and the Role of the WTO,
Research Handbook on Transparency, (Padideh Ala’i & Robert Vaughn at Am. U. Wash. C. L., eds. 2014), available on
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract¼2500871.
24Sylvia Ostry, External transparency: the policy process at the national level of the two-level game, in DOHA AND
BEYOND: THE FUTURE OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM (Mike Moore ed., 2004).
25Linguistically, transformation means “a marked change in form, nature, or appearance.” Transformation, OXFORD
DICTIONARIES BRITISH AND WORLD ENGLISH, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/transformation (last visited
27 July 2016).
26Sylvia Ostry argues that there was no objection from any “contracting party” on the draft of Article X of GATT 1947,
since they all thought that this was just a pro forma provision due to its lack of procedural or substantive force. See
Sylvia Ostry, Article X and the concept of transparency in the GATT/WTO, in CHINA AND THE LONG MARCH TO GLOBAL TRADE:
THE ACCESSION OF CHINA TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Sylvia Ostry, et al. eds., 2002). Consequently, GATT panels from
1947 to 1984 made no reference to it. See also Ala’i & D’Orsi, supra note 23.
27See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R Weingast, Administrative procedures as instruments of political
control, 3 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 243 (1987), https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/3/2/243/859002/Administrative-
Procedures-as-Instruments-of?redirectedFrom ¼ PDF.
28On 1 January 1948, GATT 1947 entered into force. The 23 founding Member states were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma,
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States. WTO Press Brief, Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Unilateral Trading System, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm.
29Sylvia Ostry, Convergence and sovereignty: Policy Scope for Compromise?, in COPING WITH GLOBALIZATION 52 (Aseem
Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds. 2003).
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In actual practice, the political doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the US Constitution and that
underlay Article 10 was impossible to apply to GATT 1947 because it had neither any formal organizational
status as a legislative body (because of the nonexistence of the ITO), nor did it consider any official procedures
for dispute settlement by an independent judiciary.30 Fortunately, the US government had successfully
provided models for administrative procedure and international trade law, whereby “emphasis on transparency,
fairness, and access to the courts has increased the accountability, fairness, efficiency, and acceptability of a
wide range of government decision making.”31 As a result, despite the incompatibility of Article X with the
underlying GATT structure, its adoption has played a significant role in shaping so-called global governance.
The transparency norms embodied in Article X of GATT 1947 have, undeniably, become important for
international trade regimes since the establishment of the WTO in 1995. Clearly, Article X of GATT 1994 is aimed
at promoting transparency and building an environment of trust among member states.32 Since the mid-
nineties, many legal and political scholars have praised the transparency norms as a multifunctional tool that
can bring fruitful outcomes. For instance, Charnovitz considers the WTO’s transparency regulations “one of the
most positive but least known features of WTO law” that can impact human rights around the world.33 Howse
believes that transparency norms help enhance democracy in countries abiding by the WTO legal system.34
This paper argues that the spirit of Article X of GATT 1994 is to promote the rule of law in the WTO context.
As background, the concept of the rule of law originated in Anglo-Saxon legal systems35 and is found in the
constitutions of Western countries as a supreme legislative principle with respect to equality, human rights,
stability, and predictability of legal systems (or due process). Carothers asserts that the rule of law is a core
principle of a legal system that consists of three elements: (1) clear, fair, and effective laws, in which political
and civil liberties are enshrined; (2) fair, competent, and efficient central institutions, including a judicial
branch that must be independent; (3) officials and public servants who have to be accountable to the law.36
Similarly, in international law, the United Nation’s Secretary-General defines the rule of law as a “principle of
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and
which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”37
30In fact, there was a dispute settlement system under GATT 1947 based on its Articles XXII and XXIII, but it was weak,
ineffective, and non-binding. Professor William J. Davey states that “[A]rticle XXIII only outlines how disputes are to be processed
in the GATT system, it does not establish any formal procedures for handling them . . . [f]rom the outset it was evident that a
general meeting of all contracting parties would be ill-suited to consider disputes.” William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT,
11 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 51, 109 (1987). Then such procedures had to wait until the Uruguay Round 1994. For more details, see
WTO, Dispute Settlement System Training Module, Chap. 2, Historic development of the WTO dispute settlement system,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s1p1_e.htm (last visited 29 July 2016).
31Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 65, 80 (1996).
32Weiss & Steiner, supra note 18, at 1456.
33Charnovitz, supra note 18, at 100.
34Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade Organization, 98
MICHIGAN L. REV. 2329, 2357 (2000).
35This concept originated in 1215, when King John of England signed the Magna Carta (or Great Charter), in which
“due process” was first mentioned. The Magna Carta in England and subsequent Bill of Rights of American jurisprudence
have been recognized as emblems of the rule of law. For more information, see ABA Division for Public Education, Part I:
What is the Rule of Law?, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/Part1DialogueROL.
authcheckdam.pdf (last visiteded 29 July 2016).
36Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 95, 106 (1998).
37U.N. Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, { 6, U.N. Doc.
S/2004/616* (August 23, 2004).
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From foregoing core ideas, the World Justice Project38 developed the four principles of the rule of law:
regulatory quality, government accountability, due process, and an effective and independent judiciary.
Following this definition, unquestioningly, Article X of GATT 1994 is aimed at promoting the rule of law
within member states, specifically transition countries, under the naïve Western assumption that the rule of
law is “an elixir” to improve economic performance. The following table presents this hypothesis as
demonstrated by the implications of the rule of law in Article X of GATT 1994:
Table 1: The Rule of Law embedded in Article X GATT.
The Rule of Law39 Article X
(Defined by World
Justice Project)
GATT 1994
PRINCIPLES Regulatory
quality
The laws are clear,
publicized, stable, and just;
are applied evenly; and
protect fundamental rights,
including the security of
persons and property
Laws shall be published
promptly. Agreements affecting
international trade policy shall
also be published. (Article X:1)
Due
process40
The process by which the
laws are enacted,
administered, and enforced is
accessible, fair, and efficient.
Each contracting party shall
administer all its laws in a
uniform, impartial, and
reasonable manner. (Article X:3)
Accountability The government and its
officials and agents, as well
as individuals and private
entities, are accountable
under the law.
The central administration may
take steps to obtain a review of
a matter in another proceeding
if there is good cause to believe
that the decision in the matter
is inconsistent with established
principles of law or the actual
facts.
Independent
judiciary
Justice is timely delivered by
competent, ethical, and
independent representatives
and neutrals who are of
sufficient number, have
adequate resources, and
reflect the makeup of the
communities they serve.
Institute judicial, arbitral, or
administrative tribunals or
procedures that shall be
independent of the agencies
entrusted with administrative
enforcement. (Article X:3)
38An independent, multidisciplinary organization working to advance the rule of law around the world. Official website:
http://worldjusticeproject.org/.
39WTO Analytical Index: GATT 1994, General agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_04_e.htm; cf. http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law (last visited 29 July 2016).
40“A fundamental, constitutional guarantee that all legal proceedings will be fair and that one will be given notice of
the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard before the government acts to take away one’s life, liberty, or property.
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The first paragraph of Article X prominently introduces the principle of publicity that is associated with
the right to know, despite the fact that the text of Article X explicitly limits the scope of public disclosure
to laws or regulations related to “customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to
requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor
[sic], or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition,
processing, mixing or other use.”41 The term “transparency” is not even explicitly used, but the
foundational features of transparency (publicity and disclosure) obviously impact domestic administrative
law to some extent. Practically, to adapt to (or comply with) the requirements of Article X, states have to
institutionalize or internalize transparency norms by enacting FOI laws or administrative procedure acts
and the like. Interestingly, Article X directly creates horizontal transparency to protect the interests of
traders and investors of its member states (trade facilitation), but also indirectly impacts legal reform in
transition states in favor of upward and in/outward transparency, thus eventually contributing to the
respect for human rights (the right to know).
In fact, Article X has regularly been invoked to address the individual right of access to information of
“traders,” “investors,” or “importers” and the like. Of course, the WTO and its Appellate Body always
perceive that they cannot and should not go beyond their mandate to address issues irrelevant to trade,
such as human rights or democracy. However, the principle of publicity embedded in Article X indirectly
affects the domestic legal systems by requiring respect for the right to know, or FOI.
Even though the relevance of human rights in Article X has never been directly referred to in WTO
jurisprudence, many scholars have emphasized that there is growing awareness in the WTO that standards
of accountability “potentially provide an independent source of legitimacy, derived not just from states,
but directly from citizens.”42 WTO leaders believe that transparency is an indispensable condition for
democratic accountability, and that by engaging in transparency, “good faith” will likely emerge. In this
sense, the WTO attempts to promote input legitimacy not only in its decision-making process, but also
through members’ domestic law-making procedures. Hence, we can see a similarity in purpose between
building public trust through the EU’s transparency initiatives and promoting “good faith” through WTO
transparency norms.
It is striking that the WTO Appellate Body and Panel have scarcely mentioned the term “accountability” in
their reports, but have regularly addressed the obligations of government and bureaucrats to account for
their activities and transparently disclose their functioning. Take, for example, Dominican Republic — Import
and Sale of Cigarettes (2005), in which the Panel decreed, “In order to become acquainted with the process
of establishing the tax base for the application of the Selective Consumption Tax on cigarettes, governments
Footnote continued
Also, a constitutional guarantee that a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.” Due Process of Law,
WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 2008), http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
DueþProcess þ of þ Law.
41In EC — Selected Customs Matters, the Panel found that “[L]aws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative
rulings of general application’ described in Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 are laws, regulations, judicial decisions and
administrative rulings that apply to a range of situations or cases, rather than being limited in their scope of application.”
Panel Report, EC—Selected Customs Matters, { 7116, WTO Doc. WT/DS315/R (adopted 16 June, 2006).
42Elizabeth Smythe & Peter J. Smith, Legitimacy, transparency, and information technology: The world trade
organization in an era of contentious trade politics, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: REV. MULTILATERALISM & INT’L ORGS. 31,
53 (2006).
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and traders would be entitled to obtain information on the results of the survey, as well as on the
methodology used in order to conduct the survey.”43 In other words, the competent authorities are
responsible for comprehensively disclosing their conduct, processes, and methods in favor of the right to
know. Similarly, in Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines) (2011), the Panel reiterated the importance of the
publication and disclosure of governmental information in a clear and adequate manner:
We are of the view that for importers to become acquainted with the methodology for determining
the MRSP, it is important for them to become familiar with, for instance, how the information they
provide is processed. Also, they need to be informed on how Thai Excise determines the marketing
costs where the information provided by importers is not accepted.44
In these two cases, the panel seized on the words and phrases “published promptly” and “to become
acquainted” to obligate authorities or bureaucracies to account for what they have done. The principle of
publicity therefore expanded not only from the publication of policy but also from accountability for how
policies are made. Wolfe (2013) argues that transparency is a political environment through which citizens
hold their governments accountable, and transparency today consists of three dimensions: predictability,
simplification, and accountability.45 Article X should thus be taken into account as a manifestation of these
principles of the rule of law.
“Due process” is a term used frequently in WTO panel reports referring to Article X of GATT. One of the
most clearly declared aims was in the EC — Selected Customs Matters (2006) where the Panel concluded
that Article X:3 needed to be acknowledged in the context of the following provision: “Article X of the
GATT 1994 contains a ‘due process theme’, which suggests that the aim of Article X:3 is to ensure that
traders are treated fairly and consistently when seeking to import from or export to a particular WTO
Member.”46 More clearly, in US — Underwear (1997), the Appellate Body asserted the important principle
of due process concealed in the spectrum of Article X as follows:
Article X:2, General Agreement, may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance-
that of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private persons and
enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality.47
Professor Padideh Ala’i (2008) notes that the Appellate Body has broadened the applicability of Article
X to include domestic administration and the rights of citizens of all member states.48 Therefore, the
interpretation of WTO jurisprudence requirements relating to due process in the system of laws,
regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings embedded in Article X are demonstrated through
improvements to the rule of law in domestic administrative law systems.
Regarding the principle of an independent judiciary, Article X:3(b) and (c) unfortunately cannot impose
compulsory regulations mandating independent tribunals and administrative reviews. Instead, Article X
calls on each member state to institute judicial or administrative tribunals “as soon as practicable” to
43Panel Report, Dominican Republic — Import and Sale of Cigarettes, { 7.407, WTO Doc. WT/DS302/R, (adopted
26 Nov. 2004).
44Panel Report, Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines), { 193, WTO Doc. WT/DS371/R (adopted 15 Nov. 2010).
45Robert Wolfe, Regulatory Transparency, supra note 9, at 182.
46Selected Customs Matters, supra note 41, { 193.
47Appellate Body Report, US – Underwear, 21, WTO Doc. WT/DS24/AB/R (adopted Feb. 10, 1997).
48Padideh, Periphery, supra note 20, at 782.
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independently review administrative actions. This weakness could be attributed to inconsistency among
the domestic legal infrastructures of state members.49 Moreover, the WTO does not explicitly intend to
interfere in the domestic polity of member states, including the procedural rules for institutional structures.
For example, in Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines), the Panel tried to limit the scope of the application of
prompt review mentioned in Article X:3(b) as follows:
[W]e are of the view that Article X:3(b) of the GATT 1994 requires a WTO Member to establish and
maintain independent mechanisms for prompt review and correction of administrative action in the
area of customs administration. However, neither text nor context nor the object and purpose of
this Article require that the decisions emanating from such first instance review must govern the
practice of all agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement throughout the territory of a
particular WTO Member.50
As a result, the provisions of Article X:1, 2 can be deemed to be transparency obligations, whereas
those of Article X:3 may be considered a set of recommendations rather than requirements for states. The
Appellate Body has attempted to find an amicable solution to this inconsistency by interpreting Article X
through litigation. In EC — Selected Customs Matters (2006), the Panel pointed out that “in some WTO
Members, administrative action relating to customs matters may be reviewed by the same administrative
authority,”51 but this kind of review is not allowed under Article X:3(b) of GATT 1994 due to the absence of
independence. Thus, the Panel provided a definition of “independent review” as “free of control or
influence from the administrative agencies whose decisions are the subject of review, [so as to act] with
freedom in institutional and practical terms from interference by the agencies whose decisions are being
reviewed.” No mechanism was proposed for independent tribunals or administration under this
interpretation.
In sum, the intention of Article X of GATT (both 1947 and 1994) was to provide compelling
requirements (or suggestions) for enhancing the rule of law within WTO state Members. We can see that
Article X of GATT was easily accepted by all contracting parties in Geneva for the following reasons:
(1) The insufficient legal force of Article X:3
(2) The many potential benefits of the rule of law promoted by Article X and transparency principles,
including trade facilitation, democratization, and good governance, as noted by Carothers.52
Article X of GATT is not sui generis. The WTO right to know, notification, publication, and other
transparency-related provisions are enshrined in many other different WTO agreements with different
dimensions, including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),53 the Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) Agreement,54 and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures Agreement.55
49Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1, 21 (1998)
[hereinafter, Ostry, China and the WTO ].
50Cigarettes, supra note 43, { 7.1053.
51Selected Customs Matters, supra note 40, { 7.520.
52Carothers, supra note 35, at 99.
53General Agreement on Trade in Services, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B
(15 Apr. 1994), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsintr_e.htm.
54Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A (15 Apr. 1994), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm.
55Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A (15 Apr. 1994), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm.
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Transparency and due process requirements in Annex 1A Agreements: Addressing
good governance in domestic administrative law
Sylvia Ostry asserts that Article X of GATT spearheaded the enabling and reform of domestic legal
infrastructures, and more directly, the administrative law practices of Member states.56 Administrative
harmonization is aimed at facilitating multilateral trade and requiring domestic administrative regimes to
be reformed toward good governance. Ala’i and D’Orsi argue that beyond Article X of GATT, other Annex
1A Agreements also embrace many provisions addressing transparency and due process not directly linked
to Article X.57 In fact, Article X of the GATT has been perceived as a general benchmark, or even a slogan,
for the propaganda of transparency. Therefore, Article X, ipso facto, is not likely to promote good
governance significantly and effectively within Members without the system of notification obligations
found throughout other Annex 1A Agreements.
Notification Obligations: Enhancing the Legitimacy of the Domestic
Administrative Process
Under the title “Transparency,” Article 7 of the SPS Agreement includes the following provision: “Members
shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary measures and shall provide information on their
sanitary or phytosanitary measures.” Correspondingly, Member states have to meet requirements
embedded in Annex B, including publication, notification, and establishment of enquiry points. Needless
to say, WTO’s attempts to address the administrative legal systems of its Members were intended to
enhance not only transparency between countries but also within countries, preventing internal
discrepancies by imposing the principle of regulatory transparency. As Wolfe observes, “transparency
between countries appears easier than transparency within countries.”58 Annex B provisions are easily
adapted by countries that are Members of the OECD or EU, but developing countries may find them
difficult to comply with. Annex B-1 of the SPS Agreement mandates that states “shall ensure that all
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations which have been adopted are published promptly in such a
manner as to enable interested Members to become acquainted with them,”59 echoing verbatim
Article 9 of GATT relating to publication. Due to the inconsistency and unpredictability in the legal
infrastructures of some Members, specifically developing countries, Annex B-2 of the SPS Agreement
provides flexibility in the amount of time allowed “between the publication of a sanitary or phytosanitary
regulation and its entry into force.”60 As a result, Annex B-2 threatens to “soften” the transparency
requirements of Article 7.
In India — Agricultural Products (2014), the Panel examined the relationship between Article 7 and
Annex B-2:
Article 7 of the SPS Agreement requires Members to notify changes in their SPS measures and to
provide information on their SPS measures “in accordance with the provisions of Annex B”.
Therefore, Article 7 must be read together with the provisions of Annex B of the SPS Agreement.
56Ostry, China and the WTO, supra note 49, at 20.
57Ala’i & D’Orsi, supra note 23, at 371.
58Wolfe, Regulatory Transparency, supra note 9, at 170.
59SPS Agreement, supra note 55, Annex B-1.
60Id., Annex B-2.
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The intertwined nature of the relationship between Article 7 and Annex B has led prior panels and
the Appellate Body to find that an inconsistency with the provisions of Annex B results in an
inconsistency with Article 7, and that a failure to prove a violation of Annex B results in the same
failure regarding Article 7.61
Similar to what has been discussed in the case of Article X of GATT regarding the “default”
inconsistency in transparency requirements, Article 7, in conjunction with Annex B, involves the same type
of conflict between soft law and quasi-hard law. Again, the WTO jurisprudence has attempted to reduce
the legislative inconsistency through practical regulation. Then, a strong rule-based trading system may, in
turn, support the domestic administrative law system with or without relating to trade. To demonstrate this
hypothesis, this paper analyzes another inconsistency in notification requirements: the confusion between
SPS measures (mentioned in Article 7) and regulations (Annex B-1), inasmuch as “regulations” cannot be
used as a synonym for “measures” linguistically. In order to shed light on this confusion, in Japan —
Agricultural Product II (1998), the Panel attempted to clarify the publication and notification requirements
as follows:
Therefore, in our view, for a measure to be subject to the publication requirement in Annex B,
three conditions apply: (1) the measure “[has] been adopted”; the measure is a “phytosanitary
regulation”, namely a phytosanitary measure such as a law, decree or ordinance, which is (3)
“applicable generally.” 62
Therefore, the Panel has tried to interpret transparency obligations in a teleology that broadens the
scope of application of Article 7 and Annex B-1 to encompass the domestic legal environment of Member
states. While these notification obligations are mandated for particular areas relating to trade, they can
impact the whole legal system because it consists of a close-knit network of laws, decrees, and
ordinances that must be matched. Ultimately, transparency requirements enshrined in notification
obligations, to some extent, positively impact domestic governance and bureaucracy.
A number of transparency provisions embedded in the TBT Agreement show the same tendency, such
as: Articles 2 and 3 (technical regulations); Articles 5, 7, 8, and 9 (conformity assessment procedures);
Annex 3 and Articles 10 (general transparency provisions); and 15 (final provisions).63 Transparency is
emphasized as a “fundamental pillar in the implementation of the TBT Agreement” by the Committee on
TBT.64 The TBT Agreement emphasizes the role of central government bodies in implementing the
notification of regulations. Clearly, this centralization is intended not only to reduce costs of decisions but
also to enhance the consistency of the system of TBT-related policy. Moreover, the SPS Agreement
intentionally addresses the input legitimacy65 of domestic policies relating to trade. According to Article
61Panel Report, India — Agricultural Products, { 7.741, WTO Doc. WT/DS430/R (adopted 14 October 2014).
62Panel Report, Japan — Agricultural Product II, { 8.109, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/R (adopted 27 October 1998).
63SPS Agreement, supra note 54.
64WTO, Decisions and recommendations adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade since 1
January 1995 - Note by the Secretariat WTO Doc. G/TBT/1/Rev.12 (21 Jan. 2015), http://web.wtocenter.org.tw/Page.aspx?pi
d¼258993&nid¼13119.
65Input legitimacy here “means that social acceptance of the structure in question derives from a belief that citizens
have a fair chance (however understood) to influence decision-making and scrutinise the results.” See Deirdre Curtin &
Albert Meijer, Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy? A Critical Analysis of European Union Policy Documents, 11 INFO.
POLITY 109,122 (2006).
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2:2, states must issue technical regulations that are not “more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a
legitimate objective,” including, but not limited to, the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health; or the environment.66 A corollary to this provision is
that, beyond trade facilitation and the elimination of protectionism, the TBT Agreement, along with the SPS
Agreement, has attempted to balance different interests in policymaking, so that technocratic input
legitimacy will be enhanced. As noted by Cassese (2004):
The SPS Agreement seeks to reconcile free trade with the sanitary and phytosanitary measures
necessary to protect human, animal, and plant health. The TBT Agreement seeks to balance the
needs of international commerce with the safety of products and processes, because excessively
and unjustifiably complex national rules governing products, processes, and methods of production
might discriminate against foreign products.67
In many cases, the domestic infrastructure of Member states cannot meet the above requirements
appropriately and comprehensively. International standards from good regulatory practice will be used as
a “magnetic needle” for domestic regulation, thus cultivating harmonization by regulatory standardization
as provided in Article 3 of the TBT Agreement.68 Understanding that TBT-related policy differences and
divergence have resulted in the gap in comparative advantages among nations,69 the Committee on TBT
agreed that transparency and public consultation are determinant mechanisms for international
standardization contributed by all Members.70 Through democratic participation, the input legitimacy of
domestic regulatory regimes is likely to be consolidated. According to Mitchell’s theory of administration
legitimacy, central or local government entities of Member states, following Articles 2 and 3 of the TBT
Agreement, must have the right to determine relevant regulations and must ensure that public tasks are
handled according to principles of transparency, public consultation, and democratic accountability.71 In
this sense, the transparency principle embodied in notification obligations is aimed at improving the
legitimacy of domestic administration.
Enquiry Points: Promoting Responsiveness and Accountability
According to Article 10 of the TBT Agreement and Annex B of the SPS Agreement, each Member shall
establish one enquiry point through which all reasonable questions relating to the following will receive
a response:
66SPS Agreement, supra note 54.
67Sabino Cassese, Global standards for national administrative procedure, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109,126
(2004).
68According to Article 3, “Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards,
guidelines or recommendations, where they exist.”
69Graham Mayeda, Developing disharmony? The SPS and TBT agreements and the impact of harmonization on
developing countries, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 737, 764 (2004).
70Secretariat—Revision, supra note 63.
71Joe P. Mitchell, III, The Central Bankers: Administrative Legitimacy and the Federal Reserve System, (25 Feb. 2000)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & St. Univ.), https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-
0305100-180653/unrestricted/Title.pdf.
Van Tran, International Review of Law 2016:iit.2 13 of 24 pages
These national enquiry points are a means of disseminating information on technical regulations in
response to reasonable and relevant questions. Functionally, enhancing regulatory transparency by
promoting maximum disclosure, predictability, and consistency of the domestic administrative law system
has been emphasized in the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation72 as a mechanism for not only
facilitating trade but also for monitoring the compliance. Accordingly, each member, relying on “available
resources,” takes responsibility for establishing national enquiry points to provide information for
interested parties or stakeholders. These enquiry points are then deemed an information channel for
responding to countries or persons submitting questions,73 thus mutually increasing internal and external
transparency.
In “Recommended Procedures for Implementing the Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement,”74
the Committee agreed that administrative responsiveness national enquiry points should be more timely:
“Members are strongly encouraged to comply with the five-day deadline” by taking full advantage of
information and communication technologies. (Members should use fax and email facilities or publish
regulations on the internet). Clearly, information infrastructure plays an important role in promoting
government responsiveness to the informational demands of countries, investors, traders, and even
citizens to eliminate information asymmetries relating to trade. The WTO Committee on SPS emphasized
the obligations of responsiveness:
Members are obliged to designate a single central government authority as responsible for the
implementation at the national level of the provisions concerning notification procedures . . . [e]ach
Table 2: Designated enquiry points for the TBT and SPS Agreement.
SPS Agreement TBT Agreement
– Sanitary or phytosanitary regulations – Technical regulations, standards, conformity
assessment procedures, or proposed
conformity assessment procedures, adopted
or proposed central or local government
bodies, by non-governmental bodies which
have legal power to enforce, or by regional
standardizing bodies of which such bodies
are Members or participants
– Control and inspection procedures,
production and quarantine treatment,
pesticide tolerance and food additive
approval procedures
– Risk assessment procedures, factors,
appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection
The Membership and participation of the Member, or of relevant bodies within its territory, in
international and regional sanitary and phytosanitary organizations and systems, as well as in
bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements within the scope of this Agreement, and
the texts of such agreements and arrangements.
72WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA) (inserted into Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement 27 Nov. 2014),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm.
73How to apply the transparency provisions of the SPS Agreement: A Handbook prepared by the WTO Secretariat. 7,9.
Sept. 2002), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spshand_e.pdf.
74WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Recommended Procedures for Implementing the
Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7), 4, Vol. G/SPS/7/Rev. 3 (1 Dec. 2008), link available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/decisions06_e.htm.
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Member “shall ensure that one enquiry point exists” which is responsible for the provision of
answers to all reasonable questions as well as the provision of relevant documents.75
In essence, WTO transparency requirements embedded in enquiry points initiatives, to some extent,
positively impact the legitimacy and democracy of Member states. In this relationship, developing
countries will enjoy overall advantages: they have a right to be treated favorably, based on the provisions
of special and differential treatment of developing Member states in the SPS, TBT, and other agreements,
but can request technical assistance from developed Member states in building responsive regulation,
including notification procedures, enquiry points, and the like. As Speer (2012) notes:
The most frequently cited reasons for promoting the implementation of participatory governance
mechanisms in developing countries are that it improves public service delivery, that it empowers
citizens and that it deepens democracy. More specifically, participatory governance is stated to
increase local government responsiveness and accountability.76
In thinking so, technical assistance77 and the Code of good practice78 in the TBT and SPS Agreements
are tools of the developed world utilized as political-economic weapons to attack the circumstances of
poor governance and the lack of responsiveness and accountability in developing countries. Naiki (2009)
argues that SPS and TBT-related regulations provide an accountability mechanism for facilitating
interactions (cooperation or coordination) among States and promoting transparency, responsiveness,
legitimacy, and accountability, commonly known as democratic values.79
With regard to these democratic qualities, the WTO Committee on SPS defined public participation as
information exchange in regular biennial meetings, in which representatives of interested observers
participate and discuss technical issues.80 In spite of leaving any policy-related consideration to the
Committee itself, a person responsible for enquiry points still has opportunities to respond to and account
for technical issues in domestic policies, while other meeting participants can inquire, discuss, or consult
on relevant matters. Public participation will thus enhance the input legitimacy of the TBT and SPS,
creating the environment of responsiveness and accountability, as argued by Orden and Roberts (2007):
75Id. at 1.
76Johanna Speer, Participatory governance reform: A good strategy for increasing government responsiveness and
improving public services? 40 WORLD DEV. 2379, 2379 (2012).
77According to Ulrike Grote (2002), this technical assistance includes standards, guidelines, and recommendations
issued by other international organizations, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of
Epizootics, the International Plant Protection Convention, the International Standard Organization (ISO), and the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Environmental and Food Safety Standards and International Trade:
Concerns and Challenges for Developing Countries, Paper presented at International Symposium Sustaining Food Security
and Managing Natural Resources in Southeast Asia - Challenges for the 21st Century (8-11 Jan. 2002, Chiang Mai,
Thailand), https://www.uni-hohenheim.de/fileadmin/einrichtungen/sfb564/events/uplands2002/Full-Pap-S1-3_Grothe.pdf.
78TBT Agreement, supra note 54, Annex 3(b): “This Code is open to acceptance by any standardizing body within the
territory of a Member of the WTO, whether a central government body, a local government body, or a non-governmental
body; to any governmental regional standardizing body one or more members of which are Members of the WTO; and to
any non-governmental regional standardizing body one or more members of which are situated within the territory of a
Member of the WTO (referred to in this Code collectively as “standardizing bodies” and individually as “the standardizing
body.”).
79Yoshiko Naiki, Accountability and legitimacy in global health and safety governance: the world trade organization,
the SPS committee, and international standard-setting organizations, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 1255, 1279 (2009).
80WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, supra note 73, at 35.
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International accountability is a major goal of the SPS and TBT agreements. Second, the
international agreements impose administrative costs on poor countries. In exchange, poor
countries ought to benefit from the agreements by gaining market access that enhances their
ability to participate in world trade.81
From trade facilitation to regulatory legitimacy promotion, transparency requirements provided in many
of the WTO’s agreements have significantly contributed to domestic administrative laws, regulations, or
rulings to advance openness, transparency, and accountability. Unfortunately, some developing countries
and least developed countries (the LDCs) still have not complied with notification obligations or enquiry
point requirements. According to a recent report by the Committee on SPS,82 as of September 15, 2014,
only 152 out of 160 WTO Members had designated an “SPS Notification Authority,”83 and 155 Members
had provided the contact information of their Enquiry Point.84 Six LDCs and two developing countries have
not yet complied with transparency provisions adequately. Additionally, enquiry points in many developing
countries and LDCs lack equipment, skillful staff, and mechanisms for effective cooperation.85 Hence,
obligations for notification and enquiry points obligations impose increasing pressure for compliance.
GATS’s transparency: A reform model enshrined
As previously noted, transparency provisions embedded in GATT are more specific than those of the GATS,
particularly with respect to requirements for promptly publishing “in such a manner as to enable
governments and traders to become acquainted with them.”86 Also, the GATS provides weaker
transparency requirements than the SPS-TBT Agreements, defining a “reasonable interval”87 as going from
the publication of the regulation until its date of effectiveness.88 Article VI:2 of the GATS does borrow
some ideas and concepts from Article X of GATT. For example, it mandates that “all measures of general
application affecting trade in services must be administered in a reasonable, objective, and uniform
manner” and “prompt review” by “judicial, arbitral, or administration tribunals” is necessary for
administrative decisions affecting trade in services.89 Strikingly, however, while the GATT does not use the
term “transparency” in Article X (or in the text of the whole Agreement), the GATS conspicuously invokes
the term “transparency” in its preamble when it references: “[w]ishing to establish a multilateral framework
of principles and rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of
transparency and progressive liberalization.”90
Transparency is considered an element of good governance in the WTO context, while progressive
liberalization is aimed at promoting market access with an emphasis on developing countries. But the two
81David Orden & Donna Roberts, Food regulation and trade under the WTO: ten years in perspective, 37 AGRIC. ECONS.
103, 118 (2007).
82Note by the Secretariat—Revision, Overview Regarding the Level of Implementation of the Transparency Provisions of
the SPS Agreement, {2.1, WTO Doc. G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.7 (adopted 6 Oct. 2014).
83SPS Agreement, supra note 54, Annex b(10).
84Id., Annex b(3).
85Grote, supra note 77, at 4.
86GATT 1994, supra note 11, Article X:1, replicated in SPS Agreement, supra note 54, Annex b(1).
87SPS Agreement, supra note 54, Annex b(2).
88Panagiotis Delimatsis, Due Process and ‘Good’ Regulation Embedded in the GATS–Disciplining Regulatory Behaviour
in Services Through Article VI of the GATS, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 13,50 (2007) [hereinafter Due Process ].
89GATS, supra note 53, Art. VI:2.
90Id., Preamble.
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concepts are not as distinct as those definitions sound. In fact, transparency is a prerequisite for
progressive liberalization, as the Panel concluded in US – Gambling (2004):
This requirement of transparency is undoubtedly an object and purpose of the GATS - and the WTO
in general - and applies equally to GATS schedules of specific commitments. Indeed, schedules of
specific commitments determine, inter alia, the scope of market access and national treatment
obligations that Members undertake under the GATS.91
Cottier observes that progressive liberalization has never been an easy process; rather, it is indeed a
long-term solution for balancing diversified policy, administrative regimes, political interests, and so on,
among Member states.92 Consistent with this observation, “the rules of GATS serve the purpose of
structuring the process of progressive liberalization and of avoiding the circumvention of commitments
made.”93 In addition, in developing countries and the LDCs, regulatory obstacles have resulted from
inconsistency, volatility, partiality, unpredictability, and discrepancy of legal systems and administrative
regimes. Consequently, and consistent with the GATT, the transparency and progressive liberalization
conditions mentioned in the preamble of GATS are based on a non-discrimination principle, aimed at
reducing discriminatory policies and eradicating regulatory obstacles to trade liberalization.
As Delimatsis points out, “the absence of transparency can increase the complexity and the costs of
supplying services.”94 Transparency requirements embedded in Articles III and VI of the GATS are aimed at
addressing such institutional problems. For example, Members are required to publish promptly all
relevant domestic measures or applications affecting trade in services through official websites or other
appropriate means. Publicity is based on the principle of maximum disclosure, except for confidential
information.95 Furthermore, if there are “any changes to existing laws, regulations or administrative
guidelines which significantly affect trade in services,”96 Members must promptly inform the Council for
Trade in Services. Information flow among members, notification, and responsiveness are also regulated by
Article III:3 to facilitate trade liberalization. Article III requirements of promptly responding to all requests
for “information on any of its measures of general application” and establishing at least one “enquiry
point to provide specific information” are two obligations that can also be found in the TBT and SPS
Agreements, but less comprehensively.97
91Panel Report, US – Gambling, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted 10 Nov. 2004).
92Thomas Cottier, From progressive liberalization to progressive regulation in WTO law, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 779, 821
(2006).
93Id. at 780.
94Panagiotis Delimatsis, Article III GATS: Transparency, 6 MAX PLANCK COMMENTS. WORLD TRADE L., WTO-TRADE IN
SERVICES, 107 (Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Clemens Feinäugle, eds. 2008), available on SSRN: http://papers.ss
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼1280204 [hereinafter Article III GATS].
95GATS, supra note 53. According to Article III bis, disclosure of confidential information is described as “the
disclosure of which would impede law enforcement, or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, or which would
prejudice legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.” Article XIV bis relates to information
that would be contrary to essential security interests.
96Id. at art. III:3.
97Panagiotis Delimatsis argues that notification obligations in SPS and TBT Agreements are more specific and
comprehensive than those of the GATS, relating to special notification procedure (Article 2.9 TBT and Annex B.5 of SPS),
and the function of enquiry points at national level (according to the Code of good practice). PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES AND DOMESTIC REGULATIONS: NECESSITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND REGULATORY DIVERSITY (2007) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES].
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Intentionally, Article III:4 regulates the notification obligations for Member states only, and the right to
access information therein is provided for Members, as a government-to-government relation, not one of
private service suppliers, traders, investors, or other individual actors.98 Consequently, private parties have
to contact to their governments to access information relating to other countries where they want to invest
or trade. In order to facilitate this access procedure, states need to build a legal framework for accessing
information held by the government, like an FOIA. In this way, GATS notification requirements clearly
stimulate domestic institutional reform toward openness without directly imposing administrative costs on
Members. Mattoo and Sauvé consider national transparency a global public good promoted by
international organizations (IOs), but they have observed the need to balance openness with cost:
More generally, national transparency may be a global public good the full benefits of which are
not fully internalized by each national government. In any case, if multilateral rules do create
deeper transparency obligations, there must be some way of ensuring that these rules do not place
an excessively costly administrative burden, especially on poorer countries.99
As indicated by its title of “Domestic Regulation,” Article VI is clearly aimed at reducing discrimination
in trade and services and harnessing domestic administrative regulation by applying the principles of due
process and good governance to the GATS through different measures. It explicitly attempts to facilitate
market access among Members, and implicitly fosters domestic administrative reform. Each Member is
thereby obligated to enhance its legal infrastructure to different degrees in proportion to its own level of
development, thus speeding up the process of progressive liberalization.100 Delimatsis has explained the
differential treatment accorded to developing countries and LDCs as follows:
In particular, the creation of horizontal disciplines on necessity and transparency, and depending
on the limitations expressed thereunder (e.g. the application of the future disciplines only in
scheduled sectors, the extent of best-endeavour provisions, the establishment of long transitional
periods for implementation by developing countries, or LDCs, etc.), is expected to mitigate the
trade-distorting effects of domestic regulations in the services realm.101
Overall, the foundation for administrative reform enshrined in Article VI of GATS was established to
encompass a system of legally binding provisions—a framework for the development of licensing,
qualifications, and technical standards—for the present and the future. The first three paragraphs of Article VI,
as Delimatsis points out in his article,102 identify the criteria of due process originating from the common law
system and introduce the procedural legitimacy to the domestic administration of each Member.
Additional sections of Article VI provide further standards and benefits:
- Article VI:1 provides standards for services administration, including reasonability, objectivity, and
impartiality. In US – Gambling case,103 the Panel stated that “this obligation does not refer to the
98Delimatsis, supra note 94, at 92.
99Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauvé, Domestic Regulation and Trade in Services: Looking Ahead, in AADITYA MATTOO &
PIERRE SAUVÉ, DOMESTIC REGULATION & SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION (World Bank eBook 2003), http://documents.worldbank.
org/curated/en/377591468780874144/Domestic-regulation-and-service-trade-liberalization.
100Cottier, supra note 90, at 782.
101Delimatsis, supra note 97, at 48–49.
102Id.
103Gambling, supra note 90, { 6432.
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substantive content of domestic regulations of general application but rather to their administration
and how they are applied.” This obligation is also limited to sectors where specific commitments
are undertaken.
- Article VI:2 refers to independent judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals or procedures for the
prompt review of, or appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions relating to trade in services.
If the requirements for independent judicial review cannot be implemented, then Members must
ensure their impartiality and the objectivity of the reviewing procedure. Clearly, this provision sets
up minimum criteria for procedural fairness with independent judicial (or arbitral or administrative
tribunal) capacities in national jurisdictions. However, this provision can be considered an
orientation rather than an official mandate, since states are entitled to determine the appropriate
institutional structures for the review mechanism. Consequently, developing states are not required
to initiate such tribunals or procedures if they would conflict with the state’s domestic constitutional
structure or the nature of its legal system. The ideal of progressive liberalization is for states to first
adjust or amend their constitutional and legal systems to fully comply with these requirements and
be considered a trustworthy player. These adjustments will then lead to overall legal reform.
- Article VI:3 requires timeliness and responsiveness. Accordingly, states have to inform applicants of
their decisions regarding their applications (1) in a reasonable period of time, and (2) without
undue delay in providing information relating to the status of the application.
- Article VI:4 anchors states in non-discrimination principles. No measure relating to qualifications,
licensing requirements, or technical standards is allowed if it would create unnecessary barriers to
trade (in services). The Council for Trade in Services then plays a role as a policy-anchor to
establish and develop necessary disciplines that (a) are based on objective and transparent criteria,
(b) are not more burdensome, (c) do not restrict the supply of services. In fact, Article VI:4 defines
the term necessity as the EC has: “A measure that is not the least trade restrictive to trade will not
be considered more burdensome/more trade restrictive than necessary so long as it is not
disproportionate to the objective stated and pursued.”104
- Article VI:5, similar to Annex A of the SPS Agreement and Articles 4 and 5 of the TBT Agreement,
mentions external standards developed by relevant IOs “whose membership is open to the relevant
bodies of at least all Members of the WTO.”105 Moreover, Article VI:5 provides a mechanism for
oversight on national measures for which a Member has undertaken specific commitments.
Trachtman identifies two sets of standards embedded in Article VI that need to be satisfied: the
nullification and impairment of the licensing or qualification requirements or technical standards.106
Taken together, Article VI of the GATS explicitly introduces a structural model of administrative reform
under the label of progressive liberalization. This was reiterated by the Appellate Body in China -
Publications and Audiovisual Products:
The principle of progressive liberalization is reflected in the structure of the GATS, which
contemplates that WTO Members undertake specific commitments through successive rounds of
104WTO, Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States, Domestic Regulation: Necessity and
Transparency, Summary after { 22, WTO Doc. S/WPDR/W/14 (adopted 1 May 2001).
105Definition of the term “relevant international organization” in Article VI:5.
106Joel P. Trachtman, Lessons for GATS Article VI from the SPS, TBT and GATT Treatment of Domestic Regulation (Jan.
29, 2002), available on SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼298760.
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multilateral negotiations with a view to liberalizing their services markets incrementally, rather than
immediately and completely at the time of the acceptance of the GATS.107
Reforming domestic regulation is a complicated task that cannot be accomplished in the near future.
This will be a long process of regulatory reform to eradicate (or diminish) technical barriers to trade and
increase awareness of Members of the importance of trade liberalization. Due process, including necessity
and transparency, is considered a reflection of efficiency and effectiveness stemming from progressive
liberalization.108 Trade liberalization will improve economic performance, especially in developing
countries. They will have to eliminate barriers to trade through WTO pressure via horizontal disciplines on
necessity and transparency introduced in Article VI of the GATS. GATS rules have paved the way for
administrative reform at national level to cultivate comprehensive market access among state Members.
The WTO has a unique role as a flagship of global governance that forms global administrative law.
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart argue that global administrative law helps ensure the accountability of
global administration.109 Transparency and participation are the most important elements for an effective
administrative procedure in both the domestic and international spheres. An ambitious model of reform
that the GATS introduced to WTO Members was undeniably based on this theory.
Trade policy review mechanism: Counter-surveillance device for “cleaning up”
In the Marrakesh Agreement (Annex III(a)), the founding Members of the WTO agreed to establish the
TPRM aiming to
[c]ontribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made
under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements,
and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater
transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members.110
The TPRM, in simple parlance, is an important mechanism for monitoring transparency. However, it
does not impose equal obligations on all Members. The trade policies of major players (the Quad) of the
WTO, the U.S., the EU, China, and Japan, are reviewed every two years; the policies of the 16 countries in
the middle-level group are reviewed every four years; and the policies of the remaining countries every six
years.111 Functionally, the WTO TPRM is a process for evaluating individual Members’ trade policies and
their influence on the multilateral trading system. However, it is not considered “a basis for the
107Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, {{ 392–94, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R
(adopted 21 Dec. 2009).
108Delimatsis, Due Process, supra note 88, at 20.
109Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15, 62 (2005).
110For more details, according to “Trade Policy Reviews: ensuring Transparency” available at https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm, the objectives are: (1) to increase the transparency and understanding of
countries’ trade policies and practices, through regular monitoring (2) to improve the quality of public and
intergovernmental debate on the issues (3) to enable a multilateral assessment of the effects of policies on the world
trading system.
111These “peer reviews” by other WTO members encourage governments to follow more closely the WTO rules and
disciplines and to fulfil their commitments. WTO, Uruguay Round Agreement- Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm
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enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to
impose new policy commitments on Members.”112 This process can be schematized as follows:
Questions that commonly need to be answered by states under review are related to what the state
has done so far to make domestic regulations more transparent and promote due process and
evenhandedness, and how timely the state’s responsiveness to public comments has been.114 In review
meetings, states under review have to respond to and account for the objectives set forth in paragraph A,
through which better governance and transparency are likely to be achieved. In its 2010 annual report, the
TPRB noted:
The reviews have helped to enhance understanding in these countries of the WTO Agreements,
enabling better compliance and integration in the multilateral trading system; in some cases, better
interaction between government agencies has been facilitated by the reviews. The reports’ wide
coverage of Members’ policies also enables Members to identify any shortcomings in policy, and
specific areas where further technical assistance may be required.115
(1) (3) 
(4) 
(2)
Trade Policy
Review
Body 
Secretariat Other
Members
State under
review 
Other IOs,
NGOs,
academic
works 
Review
Meetings
Figure 1: The process of trade policy review.
Notes: (1) The Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) establishes the Secretariat, (2) the Secretariat sends
questionnaires to the country under review, then discusses and drafts reports, (3) the Secretariat collects
information from IOs, NGOs, and academic works, (4) the Secretariat finalizes the report and sends it to
other Members, and (5) review meetings are held for trilateral discussions.113
112TPRM, {A(i), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/29-tprm_e.htm.
113Synthesized from “Trade Policy Reviews: ensuring Transparency,” available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm.
114See Trade Policy Review Malaysia, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/M/225/Add.1 (adopted 25 and 27 Jan. 2010).
115TPRM 2010 report, {{ 8–9, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/269 (adopted 29 Nov. 2010).
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Similarly, Francois believes that an effective TPRM can bring positive outcomes to developing countries,
such as enhanced market access and improved credibility for their domestic policies and institutional
reforms.116 For developing countries, the TPRM helps promote institutional transparency, thus stimulating
political pressure for legal reform toward liberalization. Moreover, national credibility and regulatory
rationality will also be consolidated. It is worth noting that the TPRM mutually utilized internal and external
resources for its reviews. Zahrnt argues that the TPRM strives to shape domestic politics without interfering
in domestic jurisdiction. According to Zahrnt, the TPRM has three potential functions:
(1) Facilitating negotiations: The legitimacy of trade negotiations will likely be enhanced by
“reducing the informational disadvantage of small and developing countries.”
(2) Focusing international attention: Governments tend to become more liberal in trade policies in
order to attract praise and avoid criticism.
(3) Influencing domestic politics: Counter-surveillance results in counter-learning, thus leading to
more liberal policies, which in turn increase liberal stakeholders in the country under review.
Ultimately, domestic liberal reform will result.117
Clearly, changes in domestic regulatory practice have not stemmed from direct external intervention,
horizontally or vertically. Rather, regulatory changes or reforms resulting from TPRM serve as a counter-
surveillance device that pushes states to protect their reputations from being criticized for their lack of
regulatory transparency, predictability, evenhandedness, or due process. Through the pressure imposed by
the TPRM, states under review may be cleaned up, become more transparent, and adopt practices of good
governance. Aaronson and Abouharb simply describe how this process works as follows:
No member state can use this process to force changes to another states policies, but they can
use the review to name and shame countries that fail to meet their obligations for transparency,
participatory governance and due process.118
Moreover, in order to promote proactive disclosure, Members must regularly report their trade policy
practices in reponse to the concerns of various parties, using an agreed-upon format determined by the
TPRB.119 Members also have to provide brief reports summarizing any significant changes to their trade
policy between reviews. The Secretariat takes responsibility for technical assistance to developing
countries and the LDCs under requests. Along with this reporting obligation (proactive disclosure), trade
policy review meetings can assist developing countries and the LDCs in promoting regulatory transparency
and quality of governance. As Aaronson and Abouharb observe, Member states regularly and directly
complain about problems of corruption, weakness of the rule of law, and ineffective governance in
developing countries and the LDCs during their trade policy reviews.120 Consequently, the TPRM can
116Joseph F. Francois, Maximizing the Benefits of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism for Developing Countries, prepared
for the World Bank Institute, February. (1999).
117Valentin Zahrnt, Transparency of Complex Regulation: How should WTO Trade Policy Reviews Deal with Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Policies? (Brussels: ECIPE. Arbeitspapier, Working Paper, Graue Literatur, non-commercial literature 2009).
118Aaronson & Abouharb, Clean Up, supra note 17, at 17.
119WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Rules of Procedures for Meetings of the Trade Policy Review Body WTO Doc. WT/
TPR/6/Rev.2 (adopted 14 Nov. 2008). “[T]he TPRB thought that Members should remain free to define the structure and
coverage of their own reports in accordance with Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement, and Chapter VI of the Rules of
Procedure for Meetings of the TPRB.”
120Aaronson & Abouharb, Clean Up, supra note 17, at 18. In their article, they mention trade policy reviews of Ghana,
Bangladesh, Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, Kygyz Rep, Sri Lanka, and the joint review of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.
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positively impact domestic institutional change by consolidating the legal framework for multilateral
trading, and stimulating the participation of the LDCs and developing countries in an international trading
system.
Admittedly, the developed world expects the WTO to play a more active role in cleaning up the Third
World in the common playground, particularly the “newbies” of multilateral trade. This raises the
question of the extent to which the institutional and regulatory environment of countries under review
can become more transparent or better governed, a continuing subject of fierce scientific debate.
However, anyone who believes that WTO transparency norms guarantee complete, timely, and
universal eradication of corruption and cultivation of good governance for all weak Member states will
likely be frustrated. This must be a long-term process, slow but progressive, as economist Cosbey
(2007) affirms:
Using the TPRM to strengthen that process is not a grand scheme for improving the world, and
it will not get the WTO or trade policy generally off the hook for demands to be more open
and responsive to civil society concerns, but it is a small step the WTO can take, one consistent
with its principles and practices that would contribute to the achievement of sustainable
development.121
Conclusion: The WTO transparency-norms for global administrative law
The Western countries, led by the U.S. and the EU, have successfully shaped the WTO legal
framework despite the equal-voting rule for all Members. Among other developments, transparency
norms have been transmitted to the WTO, and in turn, to developing countries. Through this process, the
principles and norms offered by the WTO, including transparency, participation, and due process, have
shaped the framework for global governance by compulsory power and institutional power. From
Article X of GATT 1947 to GATT 1994, the requirements for transparency, uniformity, and impartiality have
been intended to cultivate the rule of law as modeled by U.S. administrative law. Analogously, the
transparency provisions in the Annex 1A Agreements are aimed at promoting publication,
responsiveness, and accountability under the tactics of the “notification obligations,” “enquiry points,”
and “Code of Good practice” embodied in the SPS and TBT Agreements. More generally, but less
specifically, transparency requirements in the GATS have the ambitious goal of establishing the model of
reform for domestic administration enshrined in Articles III-VI. For monitoring and surveillance, the WTO
TPRM is a process to evaluate the system of individual Members’ trade policies and their influence on the
multilateral trading system, thus serving as an instrument of counter-surveillance to reform bad
governments and help states build trust within the international sphere. Admittedly, even though the
degree to which states absorb these administrative law norms varies depending on their domestic political
and institutional circumstances, the WTO has successfully and effectively established a foundation for
global governance upon which transparency norms, among others, will help promote administrative legal
reform among state Members.
121Aaron Cosbey, How trade transparency contributes to sustainable development as understood by Amartya Sen, in
PROCESS MATTERS: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND DOMESTIC TRADE TRANSPARENCY (Mark Halle Robert Wolfe eds. 2007).
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Transformative, regulatory transparency and the right to access information are bedrocks for the
participation and accountability associated with democratic control and oversight. Therefore, global
governance, from optimistic and constructivist perspectives, provides opportunities for states to improve
the rule of law, develop sustainable institutions, and promote democracy. In the WTO environment,
transparency norms have become powerful in addressing governance and institutional problems such as
maladministration, lack of the rule of law, and ungoverned bureaucratic discretion.
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